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Abstract
When it comes to financing the work of international organizations, voluntary
contributions from both state and nonstate actors are growing in size and importance.
The World Health Organization (WHO) is an extreme case from this perspective, with
voluntary contributions - mostly earmarked for particular purposes - comprising more
than 80 percent of its funds. Moreover, nonstate actors are by now supplying almost
half of WHO’s funds, with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation ranking as the
second-highest contributor after the United States. A number of public-health and
international relations scholars have expressed alarm over these trends, arguing that
heavy reliance on multilateral contributions is inconsistent with genuine
multilateralism. Relying on interviews with current and former WHO officials, our
study explores the causes and consequences of these trends, and recent efforts by the
WHO secretariat to reconcile growing reliance on voluntary contributions with
multilateral governance. We describe the headway WHO has made in mitigating the
risks associated with heavy reliance on voluntary contributions—as well as the
challenges that persist. Most importantly, we argue that multilateralism is not
categorically incompatible with reliance on voluntary contributions from both state
and nonstate actors. Collective multilateral decisionmaking is not a binary feature,
either present or absent. Even if the final decision to provide voluntary contributions
is up to individual donors, international institutions have opportunities to regulate
them both in terms of substance and process. The more heavily regulated voluntary
contributions are, the more embedded they become in collective decisions, the less
tension there is between multilateralism and reliance on voluntary contributions.
Keywords
World Health Organization, multilateralism, financing, assessed contributions,
voluntary contributions, budget, donors.
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1.

Introduction

The government officials that negotiated and drafted the charters of the
international organizations that make up the UN system articulated grand ambitions
for these institutions, including: the maintenance of international peace and
security 1, “the expansion and balanced growth of international trade,” 2 and—in the
case of the World Health Organization—“the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health.” 3 Yet the financial resources that member states have
provided to these organizations to advance these goals have, over the years,
remained comparatively limited. Pitched battles over the size and allocation of
organizations’ budgets are not uncommon. States often pay their assessed
contributions late or not at all. As a result, for most international organizations,
scrambling for resources is the norm rather than the exception.
Rather early on, international organizations started turning to voluntary
contributions to help fund their work. Usually member states provided these voluntary
contributions, but other international organizations, philanthropic organizations, and
other private actors have also provided such funds. Often these voluntary
contributions were earmarked for particular purposes. The total amount of such
contributions and their share of international organizations’ overall budgets has
varied over time, both across and within organizations. Still, the overall trends are
clear: voluntary contributions from both state and nonstate actors are growing in size
and importance. 4
WHO simultaneously reflects both of these trends. The share of WHO’s budget
funded by voluntary contributions has grown steadily over the last several decades
and shows no sign of slowing. During 2016-17 (the most recent biennium for which
complete data is available), voluntary contributions comprised 80 percent of WHO’s
1

Charter of the United Nations art. 1(1).
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, signed on 27 December
1945, 2 UNTS 39 (entered into force 27 December 1945) art. I(ii).
3 Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature 22 July 1946, 14
UNTS 185 (entered into force 7 April 1948) art 1 (‘WHO Constitution’).
4 Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (Brill
Nijhoff, 6th rev. ed., 2018) 688 [1022] (noting the overall trend and citing Interpol as
an example: “in the mid 1990s, 95 percent of the income of Interpol came from
compulsory contributions of the member states; in 2013, this was only 68 percent (32
percent coming from extrabudgetary resources”); Erin R. Graham, ‘Money and
Multilateralism: How Funding Rules Constitute IO Governance’ (2015) 7 International
Theory 162, 183-87 (describing growth of restricted voluntary contributions in the UN
system between 1990 and 2012); see also below n 10.
2
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revenue. 5 Nearly all of these voluntary contributions were earmarked for particular
purposes. 6 At the same time, the share of WHO’s revenue supplied by nonstate actors
has grown. During the most recent biennium, nonstate actors supplied almost half of
WHO’s revenue. 7 Strikingly, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has become the
second-highest contributor to WHO, exceeding all member states except for the
United States. 8 Although WHO is hardly alone in relying heavily on voluntary
contributions, it is the extreme case among international organizations. 9 (There are,
however, individual programs and funds of other organizations that rely exclusively or
almost exclusively on voluntary contributions. 10)
5

See WHO Results Report: Programme Budget 2016-2017, 71st World Health Assembly,
agenda item 15.1, WHO Doc A/71/28 (May 2018) 5 (noting that total revenue for the
2016-17 programme budget was US$ 4.756 billion, with $928 million in assessed
contributions from Member States and $3.828 million in voluntary contributions).
6 During the 2017-18 biennium, only 5% of voluntary contributions were flexible. This
percentage includes voluntary contributions that the WHO secretariat described as
“fully or highly flexible” and “of a medium level of flexibility.” Voluntary
contributions by fund and by contributor, 2017, WHO Doc. A71/INF./2 (19 April 2018)
2.
7 Ibid 7. Among the nonstate actors, philanthropic foundations provided 17% of
revenue for 2016-17; other international organizations provided 15%; partnerships and
nongovernmental organizations each provided 7%; private sector entities provided 3%;
and academic institutions provided less than 1%.
8 Ibid 5.
9Joint Inspection Unit, Voluntary Contributions in United Nations System
Organizations, JIU/REP/2007/1 (2007) 28 (noting that in 20005, extrabudgetary
resources as a proportion of total resources were 69.8 percent at WHO, 64.1 percent
at UNIDO, 53.3 percent at UNESCO, and 46.3 percent at FAO). Since then, that share
has grown, and not just at WHO. See, e.g., Food and Agriculture Organization, How
We Work, http://www.fao.org/about/how-we-work/en/ (noting that 39 percent of
the total FAO budget planned for 2018-19 comes from assessed contributions, while
61 percent “will be mobilized through voluntary contributions from Members and
other partners”).
10 For example, the UN Environment Programme depends on voluntary contributions
for 95 percent of its income. UN Environment Program, Funding and Partnerships,
<https://www.unenvironment.org/about-un-environment/funding-and-partnerships>;
UNHCR, Donors, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/donors.html> (“UNHCR relies almost
entirely on voluntary contributions from governments, UN and pooled funding
mechanisms, intergovernmental institutions and the private sector.”); United Nations
Development Programme, Our Funding,
<https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/funding.html> (“In order to achieve
our mandate, UNDP relies entirely on voluntary contributions from UN Member States,
multilateral organizations, private sector and other sources, in the form of
unrestricted regular resources (core), and contributions earmarked for a specific
theme, programme or project.”); UNICEF, UNICEF National Committees,
<https://www.unicef.org/unicef-national-committees> (“UNICEF is funded exclusively
3
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As Part 2 describes, advocates, scholars, and even international organizations
themselves have for some time been ringing alarm bells about the growing
prominence of voluntary contributions. A key concern is that these “extrabudgetary”
contributions are hollowing out the collective decision-making and the governance
mechanisms set out in organizations’ charters. International organizations are
pursuing the disparate projects that individual donors choose to support instead of
implementing coordinated and coherent strategies to advance the collective goals for
which these organizations were created in the first place.
Our study focuses on recent innovative efforts at the World Health
Organization to reconcile growing reliance on voluntary contributions with
multilateral governance. 11 Part 3 introduces the legal and regulatory framework that
governs the financing of WHO; Part 4 describes two key changes initiated by the
World Health Assembly, which is the WHO’s plenary organ. In 2013, the World Health
Assembly decided that voluntary contributions would no longer be “extrabudgetary.”
Until then, the practice of the Health Assembly had been to appropriate only the
portion of the budget funded by assessed contributions. 12 Since that year, the Health
Assembly has approved the entire budget under all sources of funds, including both
assessed and voluntary contributions. 13 Another notable development is the Health
Assembly’s adoption of the Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA)
in 2016. 14 To address concerns that nonstate actors had become too influential,
FENSA established detailed rules to regulate WHO’s interactions with philanthropic
foundations, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and academic
institutions. FENSA is the first example within the UN system of such a comprehensive
policy.
To assess the effects of these developments, and to better understand the
implications of WHO’s heavy reliance on voluntary contributions, we interviewed

by voluntary contributions”); World Food Programme, Operations and Resource
Situation, <https://www.wfp.org/operations-old/resourcing> (“WFP relies entirely on
voluntary contributions to finance its humanitarian and development projects.”).
11 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study
Research’, 61 Political Research Quarterly (2008), 294, 301-02 (noting that the
“extreme case method” is useful as an “exploratory method—a way of probing
possibly causes of Y, or possible effects on X, in an open-ended fashion”).
12 An example is resolution WHA58.4 of May 23, 2005, which appropriated US$995 315
000 and noted VC for US$2 398 126 000, leading to a total effective budget of US$3
313 441 000.
13 Programme Budget 2014-2015, WHA Res. 66.2, WHA66/2013/REC/1, 66th sess, 8th
plen mtg, (24 May 2013) 3.
14 Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, WHA Res WHA69.10,
WHA69/2016/REC/1, 69th sess, 8th plen mtg (28 May 2016).
4
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about 20 current and former WHO officials. 15 The interviews were semi-structured
and lasted, on average, about one hour. We selected our interviewees with a range of
experiences at the organization in management, leadership, and technical positions at
all three levels of the organization: at WHO’s headquarters in Geneva, regional
offices, and country offices. In some cases, we sought chain referrals and asked our
interviewees to identify other individuals who could supply more details about various
facets of WHO’s operations. Because WHO’s financing model has changed quite
dramatically in a short period of time, many of our interviewees had personally
experienced the consequences of these shifts. Our findings, set out mainly in Part 5,
describe the headway WHO has made in mitigating the risks associated with heavy
reliance on voluntary contributions—as well as the challenges that persist.
To be sure, our methodology has limitations. A more complete study of WHO’s
financing model would, among other things, seek out the views and experiences of
government officials and philanthropic organizations. Separately, we note that one of
the co-authors, who served as the Legal Counsel of WHO, has personal and/or
professional relationships with many of the interviewees. We recognize that our
interviewees may have been influenced by these relationships; we recognize too that
some interviewees may have hesitated to share their experiences or views in every
particular. To encourage maximally candid responses, we offered our interviewees
anonymity.
Part 6 steps back to take stock, and to consider the implications of our findings
for multilateral organizations more broadly. Most importantly, we argue that
multilateralism is not categorically incompatible with reliance on voluntary
contributions from both state and nonstate actors. As the WHO example
demonstrates, decisions about an organization’s activities and its budget are
multifaceted. Organizations’ governance bodies don’t necessarily give up all control
when voluntary contributions enter the picture. And, indeed, governance bodies can
go even further in regulating voluntary contributions and embedding them in a
multilateral framework.
Separately, when it comes to evaluating voluntary contributions, it’s essential
to consider not only their risks but also the advantages—and also to consider the
alternatives. Voluntary contributions can play an important role in assuring that
international organizations are resilient and can withstand variable support among
their member states. Moreover, some of the literature that decries voluntary
contributions is built on an unrealistically rosy view of assessed contributions and the
“regular” budget process. All financing mechanisms pose risks that international
organizations have to manage.

15

Other legal scholars have demonstrated the value of such an approach for better
understanding dynamics within a secretariat and between an IO secretariat and
member states. See especially Galit A. Sarfaty, Values in Translation (Stanford
University Press, 2012).
5
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2. The Risks of Reliance on Voluntary Contributions
For any public organization, budgeting decisions—that is, decisions about how
much money to spend, and on what to spend it—are key policy choices. 16
Notwithstanding the importance of this issue, financing of international organizations
is a “somewhat neglected” topic in the literature on the law of international
organizations. 17 The key question that has occupied legal scholars is under what
circumstances, if any, individual member states have a legal right to withhold their
assessed contributions. 18 Along this dimension, voluntary contributions do not pose
any problems because, by definition, these contributions are voluntary, and thus
member states do not have legal obligations to provide them. 19
Across the UN system, voluntary contributions have long been labeled—and
treated as—“extrabudgetary” funds. 20 Unlike the portion of international
organizations’ work that is funded by assessed contributions, the portion funded by
“extrabudgetary” contributions is generally not subject to the ordinary process for
budgetary decision-making through the governance mechanisms set out in individual
organizations’ charters. Instead, the size of voluntary contributions and the nature
and extent of any earmarks are determined by individual donors. Some contributions
are earmarked for very specific purposes, while others leave considerable discretion
to the receiving organization.

16

As Schermers and Blokker observe in their treatise on international organizations,
“The budget contains the financial reflection of the entire policy of the organization.
Its adoption, therefore, offers a possibility to discuss and review this policy.”
Schermers and Blokker, above n 4, (6th rev. ed 2018) 727 [1100]. Although our focus
is international organizations, the same is true of the budgets of national
governments and administrative agencies as well. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, ‘The
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control’ (2016) 125 Yale Law Journal
2182 (2016).
17 Schermers and Blokker, above n 4, 635 [925].
18 ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations; See, e.g., José E. Alvarez, ‘Legal
Remedies and the United Nations À La Carte Problem’ (1991), 12 Michigan Journal of
International Law 229; Elizabeth Zoller, ‘The “Corporate Will” of the United Nations
and the Rights of the Minority’ (1987), 81 American Journal of International Law 610;
Francesco Francioni, ‘Multilateralism à la Carte: The Limits to Unilateral Withholdings
of Assessed Contributions to the UN Budget’ (2000) 11 European Journal of
International Law 43; Allan Gerson, ‘Multilateralism à la Carte: The Consequences of
Unilateral “Pick and Pay” Approaches’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International
Law 61.
19 James E. Archibald, ‘Pledges of Voluntary Contributions to the United Nations by
Member States: Establishing and Enforcing Legal Obligations’ (2004) 36 George
Washington International Law Review 317.
20 Schermers and Blokker, above n 4, 688 [1022].
6
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Here is the key concern: if an international organization were funded entirely
by earmarked voluntary contributions, budgeting decisions would not be made
deliberately. Instead, these crucial policy choices would simply reflect the aggregate
results of numerous individual decisions made by donors about which activities to fund
and how generously to fund them.
Even in less drastic scenarios, there are drawbacks to heavy reliance on
earmarked voluntary contributions. It becomes more difficult—if not impossible—to
determine the organization’s activities in a thoughtful, coordinated, and coherent
fashion. The launching, continuation, and winding down of programs may follow the
availability of funding rather than a deliberate strategy. Long-term planning becomes
especially challenging because of the unreliability of voluntary contributions. 21
Setting the course of an organization’s work in this manner undermines—and
threatens to altogether eliminate—a key benefit of establishing an international
institution in the first place. 22 Moreover, the budget deliberations and decisions made
through the formal governance mechanisms set out in the organization’s charter risk
becoming empty exercises because they do not actually govern the organization’s
activities.
Reliance on voluntary contributions also threatens collective decisionmaking
with respect to program evaluation and accountability. As a formal matter, the
secretariat
reports to the governing bodies on its programmatic performance and financial
management. But supervision by the governing bodies threatens to become a charade.
When it comes to evaluating an organization’s work and making decisions about
whether to reward it with additional funds, it is the views of individual donors that
will matter rather than those of the governing bodies. Importantly, these donors are
not necessarily evaluating the organization’s work against a common standard.
Indeed, to facilitate evaluation against their idiosyncratic standards, donors often
insist on very particular reporting requirements as condition of providing funds. 23
International relations scholars have recognized that the principal-agent
models they have used to analyze dynamics between member states and international
organizations need to be revised to account for voluntary contributions. In principalagent terms, when organizations rely mainly on earmarked voluntary contributions, it
21

Thordis Ingadóttir, ‘Financing International Institutions’ in Jan Klabbers and Åsa
Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations
(Edward Elgar, 2011) 108, 124 (noting that voluntary contributions are, “by nature
highly volatile and unreliable”); Archibald, above n 19, 317.
22 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act Through Formal
International Organizations (1998) 42 Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, 10–16
(identifying the benefits of centralization through international organizations,
including efficiency, economies of scale, rational allocation of efforts and resources
so as to avoid duplication and gaps in coverage).
23 Interview with current WHO official (Telephone Interview, 9 January 2019).
7
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no longer makes sense to model the organization as the agent of a single collective
principal comprised of member states. 24 Instead, such organizations are more
accurately modeled as agents with multiple individual principals. The result,
according to some scholars, is that “[o]rganizations that primarily rely on voluntary
contributions no longer act as true multilateral organizations.” 25
Focusing on global health cooperation, some scholars have decried “Trojan
multilateralism”—that is, a veneer of multilateralism that masks the dominance of
bilateral goals and interests into multilateral institutions. 26 The risks they see are
threefold. First, Trojan multilateralism may enhance the capacity of powerful states
to impose their priorities while dampening the influence of poorer countries. Second,
donors may favor short-term political gains over longer-term public health goals.
Finally, channeling expertise and staffing to those areas favored by bilateral donors
may deplete organizational resources in other areas.
Other scholars have worried more about the growing volume of voluntary
contributions from nonstate actors. 27 Because of their size, contributions from
philanthropic organizations have garnered particular attention. 28 Some international
relations and global health scholars have raised questions about the influence the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation exercises over global health governance. Critics have
objected to how the Gates Foundation operates—with little transparency and little
input from those who are the targets of its interventions. 29 As a substantive matter,
they have also criticized the foundation’s preferences for technological solutions
while ignoring or diverting attention away from solutions that might challenge
intellectual property protections or that seek to address underlying problems like
poverty or income inequality. 30

24

The key article here is Graham, Money and Multilateralism, above n 4.
Jacob Katz Cogan, ‘Financing and Budgets’ in Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd, and Ian
Johnstone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Oxford
University Press, 2016), 903, 912.
26 Devi Sridhar and Ngaire Woods, ‘Trojan Multilateralism: Global Cooperation in
Health’ (2013), 4 Global Policy 325.
27 See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, ‘Partner Capture in Public International
Organizations’ (2011) 44 Akron Law Review 261.
28 WHO Results Report, above n 5, 5 (describing contributions from nonstate actors to
WHO during this biennium).
29 Anne-Emmanuelle Birn, ‘Philanthrocapitalism, Past and Present: The Rockefeller
Foundation, the Gates Foundation, and the Setting(s) of the International/Global
Health Agenda’ (2014) 12 Hypothesis 6; Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law
(Harvard University Press, 2014) 164-66; Sophie Harman, ‘The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation and Legitimacy in Global Health Governance’ (2016) 22 Global Governance
349.
30 Ibid.
25
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3. Financing of WHO: regulations and practice
The key instruments that govern the financing and financial management of
WHO are the WHO Constitution, Financial Regulations adopted by the Health
Assembly, and Financial Rules established by the Director-General. According to the
WHO Constitution, the process for determining the regular budget is as follows. The
Director-General is tasked with preparing, in the first instance, “the budget
estimates” for the organization. 31 He or she submits these first to the Executive
Board, which, in turn, submits “such budget estimates, together with any
recommendations the Board may deem advisable,” to the Health Assembly. 32 The
Health Assembly is then tasked with “review[ing] and approv[ing] the budget
estimates” and with “apportion[ing] the expenses among the Members in accordance
with a scale to be fixed by the Health Assembly.” 33 Each WHO member state has a
legal obligation to pay its apportioned share of the regular budget, and is subject to
the sanction of losing its vote in the Health Assembly if it fails to do so. 34
The WHO Constitution also addresses gifts and bequests, providing:
The Health Assembly or the Board acting on behalf of the Health Assembly may
accept and administer gifts and bequests made to the Organization provided
that the conditions attached to such gifts or bequests are acceptable to the
Health Assembly or the Board and are consistent with the objective and
policies of the Organization. 35
This provision supplies the legal basis for accepting voluntary contributions. 36 The
authority to accept gifts and bequests was subsequently delegated to the DirectorGeneral, thereby giving him or her the authority to manage voluntary contributions. 37
As a matter of practice, WHO has relied on sources other than assessed
contributions to fund its activities from the very beginning of its history. Consider
some examples. In 1949, WHO explored the possibility of borrowing from the World
Bank. 38 Starting in the 1950s, WHO experimented with selling world health stamps or
31

WHO Constitution arts. 34, 55.
Ibid art. 55.
33 Ibid arts. 18, 56. For a recent example of a resolution apportioning the budget
among WHO member states, see Scale of assessment 2018-2019, WHA res WHA 70.9,
WHA70/2017/REC/1, 70th sess, 9th plen mtg (May 29, 2017) 15.
34 WHO Constitution art 7.
35 Ibid art 57.
36 Organizational study on the planning for an impact of extrabudgetary resources on
WHO’s programmes and policy, Executive Board, 57th sess, EB57/25 (2 December
1975), [2.3.1]
37 Financial Regulations of WHO 8.1 (2014 edition).
38 John G. Stoessinger, Financing the United Nations System (Brookings Institution,
1964) 223-24.
32
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seals to the public in order to raise money. 39 In 1960, the World Health Assembly
established a Voluntary Fund for Health Promotion, comprised of four separate
subaccounts. 40
Separately, since 1965, WHO has co-sponsored a number of special programs
together with the World Bank and other UN organizations to attract resources for
health issues that did not otherwise garner sufficient support among member states. 41
Special programs were established to support research on tropical diseases and human
reproduction, 42 and to control river blindness in the African Region. 43 As a formal
matter, these initiatives were carved out of the WHO governance structures. Instead,
they were managed through dedicated governance mechanisms that allowed donors to
maintain tight control. 44
By 1975, extrabudgetary resources made up just over one quarter of WHO’s de
facto budget, and WHO’s governance bodies directed the organization to figure out
how to raise even more. 45 In a strikingly prophetic report, the Director-General
pointed out that while extrabudgetary contributions generated uncertainties and the
risk of donor bias in programmatic choices, they filled health needs unmet by the
regular budget and had to be promoted. 46
In the years and decades that followed, the size and share of extrabudgetary
resources continued to grow. One reason for this increase was the adoption of “zero

39

Ibid 224-25.

40Organizational

study, above n 36 [2.3.1-5] (describing subaccounts for smallpox
eradication, medical research, community water supply, and undesignated
contributions).
41 Gian Luca Burci and Claude-Henri Vignes, World Health Organization (Kluwer Law
International, 2004), 78-80.
42 The Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human
Reproduction (HRP) was established in 1965 and the Special programme for Research
and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) was established in 1978, in both cases through
memoranda of understanding among the co-sponsoring agencies that set up the
governance and procedures of the programmes. Both are still operative. See Ibid. 7880.
43 The Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) was established in 1974. In 2002, the
African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control (APOC) replaced OCP. Later, in 2016,
APOC was eventually merged into the regular programmes of the Regional Office for
Africa. Ibid. 172-174.
44 Erin R. Graham, ‘Follow the Money: How Trends in Financing Are Changing
Governance at International Organizations’ (2017) 8 Global Policy 15, 20.
45 Organizational study, above n 36 [2.1.2]
46 Ibid.
10
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growth” policies during the 1980s to suppress increases in assessed contributions. 47
Since then, member states have adamantly refused repeated attempts by successive
Directors-General to obtain meaningful increases in assessed contributions. At most,
they have granted occasional limited or symbolic increases. During the 1988-89
biennium, for the first time in WHO’s history, extrabudgetary resources exceeded the
regular budget. 48 Over the next 30 years, assessed contributions remained roughly
constant in inflation-adjusted terms, coming in at just under $1 billion for the 20202021 biennium, while voluntary contributions continued to grow, reaching about $4.8
billion for the same biennium. 49 By the 2020-2021 biennium, assessed contributions
made up just over 17% of the total WHO budget.
In describing the governance and financing of WHO, we would be remiss if we
ignored WHO’s regional structure, which is unique among international organizations—
and which poses special challenges when it comes to both coherent and coordinated
decisionmaking within the secretariat and to coherent and coordinated oversight by
member states. Per the WHO Constitution, the regional organizations constitute an
“integral part of the Organization.” 50 Each of the six regional organizations enjoys a
high degree of autonomy from WHO headquarters. A key reason is that the DirectorGeneral does not select the regional directors; instead, the states in each region
nominate one candidate who is then formally appointed by the Executive Board. 51 As
a result, the historically controversial question of budgetary allocations to each
regional office has not been left to negotiations within the Secretariat. Instead, the
Health Assembly has adopted a formula based on factors such as health and economic
status as well as access to health services. 52

47

See Yves Beigbeder, The World Health Organization (Martinus Nijhoff 1998) 154-55;
Interview with Denis Aitken, former Assistant Director-General for General
Management (Video Interview, 7 January 2019).
48 Beigbeder, above n 47,165.
49 Programme budget 2020-2021, WHA Res WHA72/1, 72nd sess, 6th plen mtg (24 May
2019) available at <http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA72/A72_R1en.pdf>. Historical numbers supplied by Brian Elliott by email dated 27 March 2019.
The growth in voluntary contributions coincides with what David Fidler describes as
the resurgence of power politics in global health law as a result of the emergence and
resurgence of infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, and concerns about
bioterrorism in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. David P.
Fidler, ‘Caught Between Paradise and Power: Public Health, Pathogenic Threats, and
the Axis of Illness’ (2004) 35 McGeorge Law Review 45.
50 WHO Constitution art 45.
51 Ibid, art. 52.
52 Strategic budget space allocation, WHA69/2016/REC/1, WHA Dec WHA69(16), 69th
World Health Assembly, 28th plen met, (28 May 2016). The current version was
adopted by the 69th World Health Assembly in 2016 and is referred to as “strategic
budget space allocation” (SBSA).
11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3434603

4. Reasserting Member States’ Collective Role at WHO
When it comes to determining WHO’s budget and activities, the Health
Assembly adopts two types of instruments. Firstly, the Assembly adopts strategic
planning documents captioned “General Programmes of Work”; these documents
provide a mid-term blueprint for successive budgets and seek to ensure their
coherence over time. 53 Separately, the Health Assembly adopts resolutions governing
the budget for each biennium. 54 Until 2013, these “appropriation resolutions”
separately addressed assessed and voluntary contributions. Take, as an example,
Resolution 58.4. 55 The Health Assembly “resolve[d] to appropriate for the financial
period 2006-2007 an amount of US$ 995 315 000 under the regular budget,” to be
financed by assessed contributions. 56 In Resolution 58.4, the Health Assembly also
“note[d] that the expenditure in the programme budget for 2006-07 to be financed by
voluntary contributions is estimated at US$ 2 398 126 000, leading to a total effective
budget under all sources of funds of US$3 313 441 000.” 57
This total effective budget was “aspirational” because there was no guarantee
whatsoever that the voluntary contributions that made up the majority of WHO’s
effective budget would actually be forthcoming. WHO member states had no
international obligations to supply voluntary contributions, nor did any other actors
who might choose to provide funds to WHO. As a result, WHO’s effective budget
depended on the success of the organization with respect to fundraising or “resource
mobilization.”
Thus, as a practical matter, WHO’s reliance on voluntary contributions cleaved
the budget process into two distinct stages. There is the “upstream” process of
planning and deciding on a budget and the subsequent “downstream” task of raising
funds or mobilizing resources. Until 2013, the two stages were almost completely
unrelated. On the upstream side, the budget was not put together with a great deal
of care because the stakes were relatively low. 58 As a practical matter, the approval
of the budget mattered because it supplied a license to WHO—and to the individual
programs and units that comprise WHO—to raise whatever voluntary contributions
53

See, e.g., Thirteenth General of Work, 2019-2023, WHA res. WHA71.1, 6th plen. Mtg
(25 May 2018) <http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA71/A71_R1-en.pdf>.
54 Articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution were amended in 1973 to enable the
introduction of biennial budgets in lieu of the previous annual programme budgets.
WHA Res. 26.37 (May 1973), 209 OR, 19.
55 Appropriation resolution for the financial period 2006-2007, WHA Res WHA58.4
WHA58/2005/REC/1, 58th sess, 8th plen mtg (May 23, 2005) 64.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Interview with Ian Smith, former Executive Director of the Office of the Director
General (Video Interview, 13 December 2018) (describing significant changes in the
seriousness with which the secretariat has taken the budget past, and describing the
historical process as “almost tokenism”).
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they could. 59 The sky was the limit: since the Health Assembly merely “noted” the
total effective budget, nothing in the budget resolution imposed a ceiling on the total
amount of voluntary contributions that could be collected, or in any way limited the
purposes for which such contributions could be earmarked. And, indeed, sometimes
the secretariat collected more total voluntary contributions than the amounts noted
by the Health Assembly. 60
This “downstream” resource mobilization was largely uncoordinated within
WHO and usually led by directors of technical units. And, indeed, some individuals
and units enjoyed a great deal of success; one interviewee referred to “kingdoms”
within WHO that were run “completely independently” because they “raised their
own money.”61 Such decentralization and personalization with respect to resource
mobilization increased the total resources available to WHO, but it also reportedly
caused internal competition and lack of communication among WHO units. It also
impeded coordinated strategic planning within and among Headquarters and the
regional offices.
From an institutional and conceptual point of view, therefore, the cleavage of
the overall budgetary process led to a striking contrast between the “upstream” and
“downstream” components. The “upstream” component was structured as a
collective decision-making process and was run through various layers of WHO’s
governance in accordance with its Constitution, regulations and rules and established
practices—yet this “upstream” process governed an increasingly small share of WHO’s
budget and activities. At the same time, “downstream” resource mobilization was
conducted in an unregulated manner largely through bilateral transactions with
donors.
Overall, WHO’s heavy reliance on voluntary contributions—coupled with the
decentralized process for resource mobilization—caused WHO’s activities to diverge
more and more from the programmatic priorities set in the budget. The voluntary
contributions were typically “heavily earmarked”—that is, available for only very
limited purposes. The Director-General had only very limited authority to reallocate
funds and align funding with programmatic priorities. As a result, some programs were
chronically over-funded while others were chronically underfunded. As former
Director-General Margaret Chan put it to member states in 2010: “given that more
than 60% of WHO’s income takes the form of highly-specified funding, an area of work
that attracts significantly more, earmarked, voluntary funding than another becomes
59

Interview with Ian Smith, former Executive Director of the Office of the Director
General (Video Interview, 13 December 2018).
60 See, e.g., Financing Dialogue, Geneva, 25-26 November 2013, Mobilizing Targeted
Resources for PB 2014-15, the Way Forward (describing the old method of resource
mobilization approaches as “[m]obilize as much money as possible without
consideration of Programme Budget limits (may lead to over-funded programmes).”
61 Interview Hans Troedsson, former Assistant Director General for General
Management (Telephone interview, 9 January 2019).
13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3434603

de facto a priority in the absence of sufficiently flexible funding to reduce the
imbalance.” 62 At least some member states recognized the problem; as a former
official put it, “enlightened member states realized that some of the programmes
they considered essential in moving the global health agenda . . . were always
handicapped and had insufficient funding.” 63
The key example of an essential but underfunded program that our
interviewees consistently cited was WHO’s work on noncommunicable diseases—or
NCDs in WHO parlance. NCDs include cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases (like
heart attacks and stroke), and chronic respiratory diseases. Many member states
consider NCDs a “top priority” and they keep repeating that that they “would like to
work on NCDs with WHO.” 64 And for good reason: NCDs kill 41 million people each
year, accounting for 71 percent of all deaths globally. 65 But NCDs have had a
notoriously difficult time attracting voluntary contributions.
To help align WHO’s funding with its program budget, Chan argued that WHO’s
governance bodies ought to reclaim a bigger role in both budgeting and oversight. The
problem, she explained, is that “[m]oney dictates what gets done. It should be the
other way around. Money should be allocated to support the work that Member States
have prioritized.”66 Noting that, at the time, only 25 percent of WHO’s total financing
came from assessed contributions, she argued the Health Assembly’s role was
insufficient:
Following current practices, when Member States approve the programme
budget, they exercise oversight and responsibility for only 25% of what WHO
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Report by the Director-General, The Future of Financing for WHO, EB 128/21 (15
December 2010).
63 Interview with Anne Marie Worning, former Executive Director of the Office of the
Director General (Email, 15 December 2018).
64 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 8 January 2019); see also Draft
Proposed Programme Budget 2020-21, WHO Doc. EB144/5 (13 Dec. 2018) 3, 18
(showing that 108 countries ranked Outcome 3.2, which addresses risk factors for
noncommunicable diseases, as a high priority during the bottom-up budgeting
process).
65 WHO, Noncommunicable Diseases (June 1, 2018), at https://www.who.int/newsroom/fact-sheets/detail/noncommunicable-diseases. On the global challenges posed
by non-communicable diseases and the regulatory measures necessary to prevent
them, see Amandine Garde, ‘Global Health Law and Non-Communicable Disease
Prevention: Maximizing Opportunities by Understanding Constraints’, in Gian Luca
Burci and Brigit Toebes (eds), Research Handbook on Global Health Law (Elgar, 2018)
389.
66 Director-General addresses reforms in WHO financing, Opening remarks at the
Programme, Budget and Administrative Committee of the Executive Board, Second
extraordinary meeting Geneva, Switzerland (6 December 2012).
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will be spending. Likewise, I can be held accountable for results achieved from
only a quarter of the money made available to WHO. 67
As a possible solution, she proposed:
to have the Health Assembly approve the entire budget. That is, a budget
based on all sources of funds and not just the proportion of the budget
financed from assessed contributions. Doing so would be a major departure
from past practices and would return the responsibility for oversight to Member
States. 68
In short, member states said they wanted realistic rather than aspirational budgets,
and Chan proposed a sort of compact. 69 Member states and other major donors would
commit to sustainable, long-term predictable and more flexible funding aligned with
programme budget priorities while WHO would commit to a realistic implementable
budget, higher budgetary discipline, transparency, accountability, coordination
among major offices, and measurable impacts. 70
In 2013, the Health Assembly implemented the proposal Director-General Chan
described above. In Resolution 66.2, the Health Assembly inaugurated a new practice:
it approved both the programme of work for the next biennium and, separately, the
entire budget for the organization—that is, “the budget for the financial period 20142015, under all sources of funds, namely, assessed and voluntary contributions of US$
3977 million[.]” 71 In addition, the Health Assembly “allocate[d]” that budget to six
categories of work. 72 Finally, the Health Assembly “resolve[d]” that the budget would
be financed by roughly $1 billion in assessed contributions and roughly $3 billion in
voluntary contributions. 73 The approved budget was and continues to be described as
“budget space” that has to be largely filled through resource mobilization, rather
67

Director-General addresses reforms in WHO financing, Opening remarks at the
Programme, Budget and Administrative Committee of the Executive Board, Second
extraordinary meeting, Geneva, Switzerland (6 December 2012) <
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2012/reforms_20121206/en/>.
68 Ibid.
69 Interview with Ian Smith, former Executive Director of the Office of the Director
General (Video Interview, 13 December 2018).
70 Ibid.
71 Programme budget 2014–2015, WHA Res WHA 66.2, WHA66/2013/REC/1,
66th sess, 8th plen mtg (May 24, 2013) 3.
72 Those categories are: communicable diseases; noncommunicable diseases;
promoting health through the life course; health systems; preparedness, surveillance
and response; and enabling functions/corporate services, as well as the emergencies
component of the budget. In the 2020-2021 budget, the categories have been
replaced by four strategic priorities and other areas, namely, polio eradication,
special programs and emergency operations and appeals.
73 WHA 66.2, above n 71.
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than an amount backed by the constitutional obligation of member states to pay
assessed contributions. Thus, the cleavage between the upstream and downstream
parts of the process persists. But the idea was that member states and others would
honour their end of the “compact” by aligning their voluntary contributions with the
approved programme of work, and thereby align upstream and downstream. 74
Resolution 66.2 contains two other important features. First, the Health
Assembly introduced, for the first time, binding budget ceilings, both for the total
budget and for each of six categories of WHO’s work. WHO would no longer have the
authority to raise unlimited voluntary contributions. 75 Second, the Director-General
gained the authority to allocate the assessed contributions as she saw fit among the
six categories, thereby giving her or him the flexibility to direct a larger share of
assessed contributions to those areas of WHO’s work that struggled to attract
voluntary contributions. Secretariat officials viewed this new authority as very
significant. One current official described this change as “huge.” 76 Another described
the combination of this authority and the development of new streams of flexible
funding (described in more detail below) as “game changers” because they gave
management “a sizeable pool of flexible funds to be used effectively in aligning
priorities and funds and safeguarding against absolute poverty of some programmes
and offices.” 77
The other notable step that the Health Assembly took to reassert collective
decisionmaking by member states was to adopt FENSA in 2016. FENSA was motivated
by concerns—especially on the part of developing countries—about the influence
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Interview with Ian Smith, former Executive Director of the Office of the Director
General (Video Interview, 13 December 2018); see also Opening remarks by Dr
Margaret Chan at the second meeting of WHO’s financing dialogue, Geneva,
Switzerland (25 November 2013) (“In a sense, the programme budget is a contract
that binds the performance of WHO to the expectations of Member States. The
obligations are a two-way street. WHO needs adequate funding to meet these
expectations. In an era of accountability, donors need for WHO to reliably report on
results and clearly demonstrate the impact of its work. . . . We all want to make sure
that the programme budget is fully funded. Only then is it truly realistic instead of
merely aspirational.”).
75 These new budget ceilings are reflected in the authorization to the Director
General “to use the assessed contributions together with the voluntary contributions,
subject to the availability of resources, to finance the budget as allocated [to each of
the six categories], up to the amounts approved.” WHA 66.2, above n 71 [7]
(emphasis added).
76 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 18 June 2019)
77 Interview with Anne Marie Worning, former Executive Director of the Office of the
Director General (Email, 26 November 2018).
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exercised by corporations, the Gates Foundation, and other wealthy donors. 78 Among
other things, FENSA regulates WHO’s interactions with certain nonstate actors with
respect to fundraising. 79 The most stringent rules apply to fundraising from private
sector entities, although to date their contributions constitute a tiny fraction of
WHO’s revenues (3 percent). 80 With respect to philanthropic foundations, FENSA
provides that WHO “can accept financial and in-kind contributions . . . as long as such
contributions fall within WHO’s General Programme of Work, do not create conflicts
of interest, are managed in accordance with the framework, and comply with other
relevant regulations, rules, and policies of WHO.” 81 FENSA goes on to emphasize that
philanthropic foundations “shall align their contributions to the priorities set by the
Health Assembly in the approved Programme budget” and that “WHO’s programmes
and offices should strive to ensure that they do not depend on one single source of
funding.” 82 FENSA also imposes transparency requirements, requiring public
acknowledgement of such contributions and their inclusion in WHO’s financial reports
and statements. 83 Finally, FENSA establishes a public register where all non-state
actors engaging with WHO have to disclose their essential information, including
membership and sources of funds as a condition for such engagement. 84
In combination, these changes enacted by the Health Assembly reflect
important steps towards reconciling collective governance with heavy reliance on
voluntary contributions. Instead of allowing the size of WHO’s budget to be
determined by the aggregate funding decisions of individual actors, the Health
Assembly was, at least, setting maximum limits overall and maximum limits for each
category of WHO’s work. To say it was deciding the size of WHO’s budget is still an
overstatement because there was no guarantee that voluntary contributions aligning
with the approved budget would actually come through. The combination of
allocation flexibility and category-level ceilings, however, promised greater assurance
that determining the program budget was not an empty exercise—and that WHO
would be able to carry out work in areas that were part of the approved program
budget but struggled to attract voluntary contributions.
Yet these changes did not eliminate the influence of major donors. Some of our
interviewees indicated that member states’ demands for realistic budgets created an
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KM Gopakumar, ‘Reform and WHO: The Continuing Saga of FENSA’ (2015) Third
World Network < https://www.twn.my/title2/resurgence/2015/298299/cover03.htm>.
79 FENSA, above n 14.
80 Ibid, 24-28; 2016-17 Results Report, above n 5, 7.
81 FENSA, above n 14, 31 [7].
82 Ibid, [8], [10].
83 Ibid, 31-32, [13]-[15].
84 Ibid, 12-13, [37]-[43].
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incentive for the secretariat to build their expectations regarding downstream
resource mobilization into the upstream budget planning processes. 85

5. Digging Deeper
Our interviews with WHO staff have helped us to better understand the causes
and the consequences of WHO’s heavy reliance on voluntary contributions. Our
interviewees pointed to a mix of external and internal forces that have reinforced
member states’ preferences for voluntary contributions. These interviews have also
shed light on the implications of voluntary contributions on WHO’s internal
management structure.
Notably, the WHO secretariat has not stood by passively as the organization’s
financing model has shifted. We describe here some of the innovative steps that
secretariat officials have taken, both formally and informally, to manage the risks
associated with voluntary contributions. Finally, our interviews allow us to detail
some of the persistent challenges that WHO faces to aligning its resources and
activities with the approved program budget.
1. The Challenges and Costs of Heavy Reliance on Voluntary Contributions
Donors’ Preferences
Not all aspects of WHO’s work are equally attractive to suppliers of voluntary
contributions. Although a prominent concern in the academic literature is that
voluntary contributions will ignore the preferences of poorer states or reflect the
foreign policy priorities of powerful states, 86 the WHO officials we interviewed
emphasized a different kind of distortion. One prominent theme in our interviews was
that donors prefer to provide resources to projects with results that were visible,
concrete, and easily quantifiable in the short term so that their investment could be
justified more easily to domestic audiences. 87 “Vertical” programs fit these criteria
quite well: these are programs that focus on the treatment of or immunization against
a particular disease without trying to address broader issues in health care systems. 88
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Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 8 January 2019); Interview with senior
WHO official (Geneva, 7 January 2019) (“You can only get money within a particular
budget, but if you don’t get that money your budget will never get up. At some point
you need to break that [vicious] circle.”).
86 Sridhar and Woods, above n 26, 333; Fidler, above n 49, 96.
87 Interview with Denis Aitken, former Assistant Director-General for General
Management (Video Interview, 7 January 2019).
88 Sridhar and Woods, above n 26, 326
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By contrast, it is very difficult to find donors willing to provide voluntary contributions
to cover staff salaries or the costs of general administrative infrastructure. 89
Of course, some of WHO’s most important work is not very easy to count.
Consider the following example:
. . . WHO does not purchase or distribute antiretroviral medicines. But the AIDS
community largely credits the technical work of WHO, especially our constant
efforts to simplify and streamline treatment guidelines, as making it possible
for nearly 7 million people in low-resource settings to see their lives revived
and prolonged by these medicines.
Obviously, it is far easier to count the number of vaccines, bednets, and
medicines distributed by single-disease initiatives than it is to measure the
impact of WHO’s technical work. 90
When impacts are difficult to measure, voluntary contributions have proved hard to
find.
In general, donors’ consistent preference for concrete, measurable outcomes
has also made it difficult for the organization to fund its normative work—that is,
WHO’s work on setting standards, generating information about best practices,
compiling statistics and the like. 91 As one senior WHO official put it, even though
some of the work her unit undertook was “extremely well-funded,” there were always
“pockets of poverty”—including, specifically, core normative work. 92 When it comes
to normative work, she continued, “everybody expects that somebody else is going to
pay for it.” 93 For example, WHO publishes a list of essential medicines – that is, those
medicines that “satisfy the priority health care needs of the population.”94 The work
of updating that list is “entirely dependent on assessed contributions.” 95
Our interviewees identified another factor that influences the kinds of
voluntary contributions that states make: whether the OECD Development Assistance
89

WHO 2016-17 Results Report, above n 5, 75.
Dr Margaret Chan Director-General of the World Health Organization, Address to the
Regional Committee for Europe, Sixty-first session, Baku, Azerbaijan, 13 September
2011
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2011/euro_rc_2011_09_12/en/ 4/8
91 The WHO Constitution specifically contemplates WHO engaging in such normative
work. WHO Constitution, arts. 2, 19-23.
92 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 9 January 2019).
93 Ibid.
94 The medicines on the list are selected with due regard to public health relevance,
evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness.
https://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en/.
95 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 9 January 2019).
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Committee will count the contribution as official development assistance. 96
Contributions to international organizations will qualify if they are “developmental”—
that is, if the contributions fund “activities that promote the economic development
and welfare of developing countries as their main objective.”97 Normative work is not
“developmental” because it benefits all states. 98
The OECD’s statistics on official development assistance are highly influential, in part
because they are verified and in part because they make it possible to compare how
much assistance different countries give. 99 National development agencies are an
important source of voluntary contributions to WHO. As compared to national health
ministries, development agencies are already less focused on the WHO’s normative
mission, and the OECD’s accounting methodology reinforces this orientation. 100
Finally, our interviewees suggested that lobbying and interference by industry—
especially multinational food and beverage companies—explains why member states
decline to provide voluntary contributions for certain kinds of work, especially on
NCDs. 101 Voluntary contributions for work on NCDs remain very limited: less than 2
percent of all voluntary contributions to WHO are earmarked for work on NCDs. 102 As
a result, WHO’s work relies heavily on other sources of funds. In fact, during 2016-17,
NCD program areas received more than half (54%) of the total flexible funds the
organization had to distribute. 103 Nevertheless, this flexible funding was not enough
to make up for the limited number and size of voluntary contributions. The program
96

Interview with Erik Blas, former Chief of Budget (Telephone interview, 8 January
2019); Interview with Meindert van Hilten, Senior External Relations Officer, Office of
the Assistant Director-General, Division for Universal Health Coverage/Communicable
Diseases and NCDs (Telephone Interview, 18 February 2019).
97 OECD, DAC List of ODA-Eligible International Organizations: General Methodology
(May 2016) < http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainabledevelopment/development-finance-standards/DAC%20list%20of%20ODAeligible%20international%20organisations%20-%20May%202016.pdf>.
98 Ibid.
99 https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/What-is-ODA.pdf.
100 Several interviewees observed that WHO member states do not always speak with
one voice, and suggested that part of the explanation was that member states are
represented by health ministries on the governing bodies—but that decisions about
funding are often made by development agencies, which do not necessarily
coordinate or agree with the positions taken by the health ministries. Interview with
Nick Jeffreys, former Comptroller (Telephone Interview, 24 September 2018); see also
Charles Clift and John-Arne Røttingen, ‘New Approaches to WHO Financing: the Key to
Better Health’ (2018) BMJ <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k2218>.
101 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 7 January 2019); Interview with
Meindert van Hilten, Senior External Relations Officer, Office of the Assistant
Director-General, Division for Universal Health Coverage/Communicable Diseases and
NCDs (Telephone Interview, 18 February 2019).
102 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 8 January 2019).
103 2016-17 Results Report, above n 5, 47.
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budget contemplated $376 million for work on NCDs, but WHO was only able to raise
(and spend) 70 percent of that amount—$262 million. 104 This dynamic is not limited to
funding; reports by the WHO Director-General and UN Secretary-General have pointed
to interference by industry to explain why member states have not made more
progress in implementing recommended interventions for the prevention and control
of noncommunicable diseases. 105
Administrative and Opportunity Costs of Voluntary Contributions
Attracting and sustaining the flow of voluntary contributions is time-intensive
and therefore quite costly. Most significantly, it consumes staff time and resources
that might otherwise be devoted to implementing WHO’s agenda. Some of our
interviewees described this opportunity cost as quite high. One senior official
indicated that she personally spent 40 percent of her time on resource mobilization
and management. 106 In addition, seven people in her office had full-time positions
dedicated to various aspects of raising money and managing grants. 107
Once a voluntary contribution is made, keeping track of the money—for
example, making sure that the right amount is available at the right time to pay staff
salaries, or making sure that spending is consistent with applicable earmarks—is a
considerable project. And finally, many donors impose particular and idiosyncratic
reporting requirements. 108 Indeed, these reporting requirements are significant not
only because of the burden that they impose on staff but also because, as noted
above, they contribute to a fragmentation of governance. Instead of WHO’s work
being assessed by the governing bodies against common standards, at least in the first
instance it is assessed against standards set by individual donors. The more individual
grants WHO receives, the higher all of these costs are. And the number of individual
grants is high. One senior official relied on 140 different awards to put together a
$130 million budget. 109
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106 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 9 January 2019).
107 Ibid.
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Harder to measure, but still sizeable, are the costs associated with the
uncertainty of whether voluntary contributions will materialize, and if so, in what
amounts. One interviewee described a “poverty syndrome”: directors of underfunded
programmes hesitated to implement activities for fear of running out of funds and
having to terminate staff. 110 Along similar lines, another interviewee described a
“vicious circle” that plagued some offices: “[I]f you don’t have enough money, you
cannot afford staff. And if you don’t have staff, you can’t implement” the projects
that donors might be interested in funding—making it nearly impossible to attract
such funds. 111
Consequences for the International Civil Service and Internal Management
There is another distortion that may arise from WHO’s reliance on voluntary
contributions. Directors and coordinators are increasingly evaluated based on their
capacity to mobilize resources rather than their capacity to implement programs. 112
In turn, one interviewee cited the possible introduction of bias in favor of hiring
individuals from major donor countries, because their own nationals are likely to be—
or are likely to be perceived to be—better at raising funds from them. 113 In this way,
heavy reliance on voluntary contributions can impede hiring a genuinely international
civil service.
Separately, over the course of our interviews, it became clear that sometimes
support for earmarked contributions has come—and still comes—from within the
secretariat. In some cases, technical directors have encouraged governments to
specify that voluntary contributions must be used for the work of their particular
units. Upon reflection, it is not surprising that technical directors who devote
significant time and personal and staff resources to fundraising would want to reap
the rewards of their efforts. Moreover, the ability to raise earmarked voluntary
contributions can be an attractive source of autonomy within WHO, making units less
reliant on decisions by headquarters to disburse assessed contributions or other
flexible funds. Some of our interviewees expressed frustration with the way the
Director-General’s office has distributed those funds, citing persistent uncertainty
about both when and how much funding might become available from those
sources. 114 More generally, the point is that reliance on voluntary contributions can
fragment the internal structure of international organizations and undermine the
responsiveness of various units to top-level management within those organizations. 115
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Finally, reliance on voluntary contributions has created pressure to rearrange
activities and responsibilities among the three levels of WHO to mimic bureaucratic
changes made by key donors. Some major donors—notably the European Union and
the US Agency for International Development—have recently empowered local offices
in developing countries to take final funding decisions. 116 As a result, the WHO
secretariat has tasked officials in its country offices with increasing responsibility for
resource mobilization. Some of our interviewees noted, however, that this transfer of
responsibility has not been accompanied by corresponding training and empowerment
for heads of WHO country offices, who are professionally not equipped to aggressively
pursue donors. 117
2. Steps WHO Has Taken to Manage the Risks of Voluntary Contributions
WHO has developed a number of formal policies and informal strategies to
manage the risks associated with voluntary contributions. These strategies
demonstrate the secretariat’s ability to not only adapt to the political environment
but also develop an entrepreneurial attitude to managing relations with donors for
the purpose of increasing funding, protecting the secretariat’s independence, and
aligning the organization’s activities with the approved program budget. Some of
these innovations predate the 2013 change in budgeting practice; others postdate it.
This timeline reinforces the point that WHO has long wrestled with the problems
associated with voluntary contributions—and has long sought solutions to mitigate
them.
Cost-Recovery Strategies
Like all other UN organizations and programmes, WHO has long had in place a
formal policy to recoup some of the administrative costs associated with voluntary
contributions. In 1975, the Director-General started imposing a 14 percent “charge”
on voluntary funds that would be used to cover program support costs. 118 In 1981, the
Health Assembly decided that a slightly lower standard charge of 13 percent would be
applied to extrabudgetary funds by WHO to cover technical and non-technical support
and services. 119
hierarchical accountability as a source of accountability within international
organizations).
116 Interview with Ian Smith, former Executive Director of the Office of the Director
General (Video Interview, 13 December 2018); Interview with senior WHO official
(Geneva, 7 January 2019).
117 Interview with Head of WHO Country Office (Video Interview, 11 February 2019).
118 1975 study, above n 36 [2.5].
119 Collaboration with the United Nations system: general matters: programme
support costs, WHA res WHA 34.17, 34th sess, 14th plen mtg (20 May 1981) [2].
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On the one hand, these program support costs are an important source of
flexible funds. Once collected, WHO can allocate the program support costs as
needed to its various categories of work. In recent years, these program support costs
totaled around $160 million per year. 120
On the other hand, the program support costs that WHO collects reflect only a
partial reimbursement of WHO’s actual costs in administering extrabudgetary funds.
Different analyses done in the early 1970s indicated that actual administrative costs
ranged somewhere between 23 percent and 27 percent of project expenditures. 121
Thus, from the very beginning, the official rate for program support costs built in a
subsidy for voluntary contributions. And, in practice, this subsidy is often even greater
because some donors refuse to pay the standard rate and the WHO negotiates the
rate downward. 122 On average, WHO actually collects around 9 percent of total
voluntary contributions as program support costs. 123
To address the shortfall between the amount collected for programme support
costs and WHO’s actual administrative costs, WHO introduced a post occupancy
charge (POC) in 2010. 124 The POC is an internal charge of 9.5 percent on the gross
salaries of all personnel. 125 In recent years, POC has totaled about $70 million per
year. 126 These funds are used to cover the costs of information technology, utilities,
and building maintenance. 127 By collecting POC to cover these costs, WHO can free up
120

Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 8 January 2019); Audited Financial
Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2018, WHO Doc. A/72/36 (3 May 2019)
59.
121 1975 study, above n 36, [2.5.3] (citing 1973 analysis that the average cost of
technical and non-technical support by WHO to UDNP-financed projects was
approximately 23 percent of project delivery costs); WHA 34.17, above n 119 (citing
an analysis concluding those costs reflected 27% of project expenditures).
122 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 8 January 2019); Interview with
Antonio Montresor, Senior Technical Officer, Department of Control of Neglected
Tropical Diseases (Geneva, 8 January 2019).
123 Interview with senior WHO official (Geneva, 8 January 2019); Audited Financial
Statements, above n 120, 58.
124 Email correspondence from Erik Blas, former Chief of Budget, to authors (21 July
2019); Financing of category 6 and cost recovery mechanisms: current practices and
proposed way forward, WHO Doc. A70/INF./5 (15 May 2017) 2.
125 While programme support costs are collected “at the source,” when voluntary
contributions come in to WHO, POC is applied “at expenditure”—that is, when staff
salaries are paid. Email correspondence with Erik Blas, former Chief of Budget, to
authors (20 July 2019).
126 WHO Mid-Term Programmatic and Financial Report for 2016-2017, WHO Doc.
A70/40, 60.
127 Financing of category 6 and cost recovery mechanisms: current practices and
proposed way forward, WHO Doc. A70/INF./5 (15 May 2017) 2.
24
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3434603

assessed contributions and redirect them to the core technical work of the
organization. 128
Core Voluntary Contributions
Another innovation, which one former official described as one of two “game
changers” 129 was the development, around 2004, of a specified category of “core
voluntary contributions” (CVC)—that is, entirely un-earmarked voluntary contributions
that constitute “core resources” that can be used at the almost unfettered discretion
of the Director-General. 130 The Director-General distributes CVC at regular intervals
during the biennium, using CVC and other “core resources” as gap-fillers to support
programmes receiving insufficient voluntary contributions. 131
CVC totaled just under $150 million in 2016-2017, with the biggest
contributions coming from Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Norway. 132
Since the introduction of the CVC account, contributions to it have remained
relatively limited. At bottom, one interviewee noted, CVC contributions are “very
much built on trust.”133 The WHO’s mishandling of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West
Africa significantly eroded that trust; and, our interviewee noted, it “takes time to
rebuild that trust.” 134
Fees for Services
Some programmes have managed the risks arising from voluntary contributions
by establishing different financing structures. In particular, WHO’s program for
prequalification of medicines and vaccines 135 and the management of the
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International Non-Proprietary Names system 136 (INN) are partly or wholly financed
through a system of fees paid by requesting entities. WHO is able to charge a fee for
this work because it provides something of value to the fee payers. For example,
medicines and vaccines that are prequalified by WHO are more likely to be purchased
by other international organizations and governments because WHO has evaluated and
approved their manufacturing practices. INN benefits manufacturers, but more widely
patients and public health officials, by distinguishing the name of the active
ingredient of a medicine as a public good from a trade name that can be registered as
a trademark.
Fee-for-service financing has some significant advantages. As one senior official
put it, this financing model enables a “huge flexibility where we didn’t have it
before.” 137 But fee-for-service also brings risks, in particular risks of capture or actual
or perceived conflicts of interest. In the case of these programs, the relevant WHO
officials deliberately designed their fee-for-service agreements to mitigate these risks
by, among other things, ensuring that the fees are not used to provide direct
technical support to fee-paying manufacturers. 138
Making Normative Work More Appealing to Donors
In order to garner more attention—and more funds—for normative activities, in
2018 the Secretariat launched a new initiative to identify and compile a
comprehensive list of the “global goods” that WHO supplies. This initiative was tied to
the preparation for the 2020-2021 budget, which defines global public health goods as
including ‘all normative and standard-setting products, data products and products
describing priority-setting for innovation and research’. 139 Generating the list was a
significant undertaking. First, individual technical units described their ongoing or
proposed normative activities on a web platform open to the entire organization—the
number of submissions totaled about 1,000; then a smaller group of technical officials
“peer reviewed” these submissions. 140 The goals were to make it possible to describe
the breadth of WHO’s contributions, to identify duplications and opportunities for
136
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coordination, to prioritize the organization’s work—and to facilitate fundraising. 141 As
one interviewee put it, he expected it to be “much easier to fundraise for a concrete
product”—a specific item on the global goods list—than for something like “maternal
health in general.” 142
At the time that this article is being finalized, it remains to be seen whether
the global goods list will yield more voluntary contributions. To the extent that it
does, though, the risk noted above of real or perceived capture by donors becomes
more salient. To some extent, the formal policies in FENSA mitigate this risk: FENSA
does not permit financial or in-kind contributions from private-sector entities to be
used for normative work. 143 FENSA does not, however, regulate voluntary
contributions from member states, leaving open the possibility that industry will work
through member states as described above in the NCD context. 144 One current official
we spoke to indicated that such questions would be addressed on a “case-by-case”
basis. 145 Another official explained that his office tries to avoid relying on a single
donor for its normative projects in order to mitigate such risks. 146
Negotiating Earmarks and Engagement with Donors
As one of the authors can attest based on personal experience, WHO’s legal
office has long had a role in screening funding agreements to eliminate conditions or
requirements that conflict with WHO regulations or policies. Examples of problematic
provisions include those that would require WHO to hire the donor states’ nationals,
or that would require WHO to implement unilateral sanctions (as opposed to those
imposed by the Security Council).
More recently, since Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus took office in July 2017,
WHO has developed another strategy. Recognizing that many states and other donors
may be reluctant or unable to provide wholly unrestricted voluntary contributions to
WHO, the secretariat has started working with donors to “reshape” their voluntary
contributions so that the earmarks are less restrictive with respect to geography,
subject matter, or both. Thus, for example, when a donor expresses interest in
providing funds for cancer treatment in Darfur, WHO will try to persuade that donor
to support the approved country program in Sudan. 147 Along similar lines, another
senior official explained to us how she had recently completed negotiations with two
donors to fund a specified “body of work” instead of particular individual projects. 148
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This “lightening” of the conditions attached to funding also extends to reporting in
some cases, so that, for example, WHO reports on “key performance indicators and
agreed deliverables, not 20 percent of the salary going here, or 50 percent of the
salary going there.”149
Notably, these renewed efforts to engage donors differently have coincided
with a change in the secretariat’s vocabulary and tone. Relations with donors are no
longer described in transactional terms; instead, relations are defined as a
“partnership” with a shared responsibility to “invest” in life-saving priorities.
Interviewees have stressed that resource mobilization is an external relations exercise
where partnerships have to be built and sustained to generate “investments” in the
organization. 150 According to one official, this framing of relations between WHO and
its donors helps WHO resist problematic earmark and funding conditions. As she
explained: “[B]uilding strong teams that are clearly focused on a relationship basis
with a set group of donors brings a much stronger capacity to say ‘no’ because it’s a
relationship . . . You’re much more able to tell your friends ‘no’ than people you
don’t know.” 151 This official recalled at least two instances in which WHO declined
proposed voluntary contributions, both from nonstate actors. 152 More often, however,
the secretariat worked with donors to “reshape” their proposed contributions to
better match WHO’s capacities, limitations, and the approved program budget. 153
Increasing Coordination and Centralization with respect to Resource Mobilization
To restructure engagement with donors along these lines, Director-General
Tedros has transformed the unit at headquarters dedicated to resource mobilization
into an “external relations team.” 154 This unit seeks to coordinate requests within
WHO to reach out to senior officials in donor agencies with single consolidated
funding requests. The stated goal is neither to eliminate the role of technical staff in
resource mobilization, nor to centralize authority on resource mobilization. Such
steps would be likely be counterproductive: many of our interviewees underscored
the importance of personal relationships and trust between senior WHO technical
staff and their counterparts in governments and philanthropic organizations. 155 When
it came to successful resource mobilization, Director-General Tedros’s key staff are
aiming for coordination rather than centralization. That said, there is an element of
centralization as well: one of our interviewees mentioned, with some chagrin, that
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several fundraising staff in his office had just been moved to WHO’s corporate
resource-mobilization team. 156
More generally, the point is that the leaders of international organizations have
some capacity to counteract the internal fragmentation that may result from reliance
on earmarked voluntary contributions. 157 Within WHO, Margaret Chan’s endorsement
of budget ceilings and the push for the Health Assembly to approve the organization’s
entire budget not only served to enhance member states’ collective control over the
WHO secretariat. It also served to reinforce director-general’s supervision and
management authority within the organization by reining in the autonomy of its
technical units. Indeed, in light of these consequences, it is unsurprising that the
proposal to introduce binding budget ceilings was controversial internally. 158
3. State v. Nonstate Donors
Finally, one issue is notable for its lack of significance in our discussions with
current and former officials given the concerns that motivated the adoption of FENSA:
our interviewees did not identify special risks or challenges associated with resource
mobilization from non-state actors other than private corporations. In describing their
interactions with donors, our interviews did not draw any categorical distinctions
between WHO’s engagement with member states and philanthropic organizations.
One interviewee described the process for engaging with both types of entities with
respect to resource mobilization as being “exactly the same.” 159
As for the effects of FENSA in particular, our interviewees suggested that
FENSA’s impacts to date were generally limited, albeit for different reasons. One
interviewee described FENSA as a “good educational tool” but one that had “no clear
impact.”160 The director of one technical office described its impact as “zero”
because the secretariat had already been managing as FENSA requires. 161 For
example, WHO does not receive funding from food and beverage companies for
normative work because of the risk of actual and perceived influence. 162 This is a
longstanding practice that predates the adoption of FENSA. 163 Another interviewee
suggested that there was “considerable variation” with respect to implementation of
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FENSA, in part because there was insufficient guidance about how FENSA’s provisions
should be interpreted, and in part because “for the large majority of cases there is no
real repercussion if it is not done.” 164 To be sure, FENSA remains a relatively new
development and its implementation will be the subject of an initial evaluation in
2019. 165

6. Taking Stock
Even if it is an extreme case, WHO is not unique among international
organizations in relying heavily on voluntary contributions. 166 This section considers
the broader implications of such reliance for multilateral institutions. Ultimately, we
argue that reliance on voluntary contributions is not categorically incompatible with
collective governance by member states.
To consider the threat that voluntary contributions might pose to
multilateralism—or to the multilateral character of international institutions, it is
necessary to unpack exactly what multilateralism means. To start, as John Ruggie has
pointed out, it is clear that multilateralism has both quantitative and qualitative
dimensions. 167 The quantitative dimension is relatively straightforward:
multilateralism suggests something about the number of states involved: surely more
than one or two. 168 Defining the qualitative dimension of multilateralism is trickier.
Ruggie has suggested that the distinctive qualitative element of multilateralism is
that it coordinates behavior among states on the basis of general rules rather than ad
hoc judgments about permissible or appropriate conduct. 169 Furthermore, he has
argued, multilateralism requires an investment by participating states in responding
to breaches of those rules. 170 As explained in Part 3, the WHO Constitution sets out
certain rules regarding the financing of WHO. Voluntary contributions don’t violate
those rules; to the contrary, they are expressly permitted. For this reason, Ruggie’s
characterization of the qualitative element of multilateralism doesn’t quite capture
the risk that voluntary contributions pose to international organizations like WHO.
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Instead, the risk is the hollowing out of the governance and decisionmaking
mechanisms—that WHO’s member states still go through the motions required by the
WHO Constitution, but their decisions are empty and inconsequential. In other words,
the main concern about voluntary contributions is that the “real” action is not taking
place at the WHO’s governing bodies. Instead, the real action is in the individual,
behind-the-scenes decisions that donors take about what kind of earmarked funding
they want to provide to the organizations—and therefore individual decisions about
what kinds of activities WHO will undertake.
In articulating why this model is not “multilateral,” there seem to be two key
problems. First, decisions are being taken individually by donors, not collectively by
WHO’s member states. Second, the narrow group of donors that provide most of the
voluntary contributions overlaps only partially with the WHO’s formal membership.
Poorer member states are de facto excluded from key decisions, while certain
nonstate actors, who lack a constitutional role in WHO governance, still get to
participate. Such exclusion is inconsistent with the idea of sovereign equality that is
expressly affirmed in the charters of some international organizations, and implicitly
affirmed in the one-state, one-vote rules codified in most IO charters, including the
WHO Constitution.
To be sure, as a practical matter, the commitment of member states to
sovereign equality with respect to the governance of international organizations has
always been incomplete. Some organizations’ formal rules give certain states special
status with respect to voting: the UN Security Council and the international financial
institutions are the prime examples. Informally, powerful states have sought, and
sometimes succeeded, in influencing organizations by influencing the hiring of top
officials. 171 As described in more detail below, these states have also withheld
contributions (or threatened to do so) in order to secure policy changes.
This observation helps to explain not only what multilateralism is, but also why
it matters for organizations like WHO to be genuinely multilateral institutions. While
some deviations from sovereign equality can be tolerated, if international
organizations stray too far from the value of sovereign equality, they risk losing their
legitimacy and their distinctive value as international organizations. 172 International
organizations—especially those like WHO, which lack the authority to create binding
171
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legal rules or to impose sanctions—are influential and effective precisely because they
are not perceived to be the handmaidens of powerful member states. 173
1. The Baseline for Evaluating Voluntary Contributions
Returning, then to evaluating voluntary contributions and the risks they pose to
multilateralism, one essential question is, as always, compared to what? Against what
baseline should one evaluate voluntary contributions? Many scholars explicitly or
implicitly compare reliance on voluntary contributions to reliance on assessed
contributions. It is surely the case that if WHO relied exclusively on assessed
contributions under current political circumstances, it would have fewer resources to
deploy in service of “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of
health.” 174 As one of our interviewees put it, “I truly believe the organization couldn’t
be what it is without voluntary contributions.” 175 WHO’s ability to raise money from
nonstate actors has helped the secretariat implement the program budget that
member states have collectively adopted but only partly funded. Without voluntary
contributions, WHO would do less. 176
Moreover, some of the international relations literature that criticizes
voluntary contributions simultaneously idealizes assessed contributions in a way that
is not entirely warranted. All possible financing mechanisms for international
organizations pose some risks and come with some disadvantages—including assessed
contributions. While states have legal obligations to pay their assessed contributions,
they do not always follow through. Sometimes they threaten to withhold payments—or
actually withhold them—to secure policy changes. While the most conspicuous battles
over withholding of assessed contributions have taken place at other organizations,
WHO has not avoided them altogether. 177 Moreover, delayed payment and
nonpayment of assessed contributions have posed persistent problems at WHO. 178
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Indeed, by relying heavily on voluntary contributions, WHO may well have
dodged significant and potentially damaging fights over withholding assessed
contributions. The point is speculative, but there’s reason to think that the magnitude
of this benefit is significant. Reliance on assessed contributions requires making
collective decisions not only about how much money to spend and on what—but also
about how to allocate the budget among member states. This last part can be
especially difficult, especially at a historical moment when the state that pays the
largest share of WHO’s and other organizations’ budgets—the United States—elected a
president who is quite hostile to multilateral institutions. If the size of WHO’s
assessed budget were larger, the Trump administration might be more likely to
withhold contributions or to pick fights over the apportionment scale. More
drastically, the United States might contemplate withdrawal. The Trump
administration has already exited other organizations, including UNESCO and the
Universal Postal Union. 179
At the same time, voluntary contributions do have some important advantages
relative to assessed contributions. They can be mobilized rapidly in the event of a
crisis situation, as they were during the Avian Influenza and Ebola outbreaks. In
addition, voluntary contributions can mitigate the consequences of individual
decisions by member states to not pay assessed contributions. The possibility of
seeking voluntary contributions from nonstate actors gives international organizations
a more diversified portfolio of potential funders, which should make the organization
less dependent on any individual funder. By making international organizations less
vulnerable to unilateral (and, in some cases, unlawful) decisions of member states,
voluntary contributions bolster multilateralism.
John Stoessinger highlighted another advantage in the book he wrote back in
In short, states might have a range of views about any particular initiative an
international organization might undertake. They might support it, they might oppose
it. In between they might be indifferent, they might be willing to tolerate certain
programs but unwilling to affirmatively support them by supplying funds. If the
question is whether to fund a program with assessed contributions, the states in this
middle category would oppose it, quite possibly precluding the organization from
engaging in the activity. 181 But if the organization can solicit voluntary funds, then
the states in that middle category may acquiesce to having the organization engage in
it. In other words, when international organizations can solicit voluntary
1964. 180
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contributions, shallow support for an activity among some member states becomes a
green light rather than a red light. 182
The scholars who criticize the lack of collective decisionmaking when it comes
to voluntary contributions forget—or perhaps overlook—that international lawmaking
and the operation of international institutions often depends on acquiescence rather
than affirmative support for a given outcome or decision. For example, there are
innumerable examples of decisionmaking by consensus, and almost no examples of
decisionmaking by unanimity, which requires an affirmative, visible show of support
from all participants. 183 Or consider the Security Council, which cannot take
substantive decisions unless all five permanent members concur. 184 It is now well
settled that abstentions satisfy this requirement, and don’t preclude the Security
Council from taking decisions—even decisions as dramatic as authorizing the use of
force. Or think about the role of silence and acquiescence in the formation of
customary international law. 185 In general, the possibility of moving forward on the
basis of shallow support and acquiescence—in the absence of strong and vocal
opposition—is crucial to the way that international law and international institutions
operate.
The possibility of moving forward on the basis of acquiescence and shallow
support is critical to WHO’s work on noncommunicable diseases. Again, the point is
necessarily speculative because it is based on a counterfactual, but it is easy to
imagine that, if member states had to affirmatively and specifically support WHO’s
work on noncommunicable diseases, it would be difficult for many of them to do so.
Industries concerned would likely rally their forces against governments taking such
positions. Instead, these industries have focused on lobbying their governments to
preclude or restrict voluntary contributions that are earmarked for work on
noncommunicable diseases. 186 This situation is hardly ideal from a policy perspective—
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but opposing earmarked voluntary contributions while passively tolerating NCD work
that is funded by other sources still allows at least some of this work to go on. 187
All that said, some genuine engagement and investment on the part of member
states—including financial investment—remains quite important. There is a paradox
here: financial dependence on member states can make international organizations
vulnerable and threaten their independence. On the other hand, the financial
dependence of international organizations may simultaneously be “essential to [their]
being taken seriously by states.” 188 Strikingly, the former director of WHO’s resource
mobilization unit insisted that the assessed contributions were a “huge benefit” to
the organization, not only because they were a source of material resources, but
because of how they affected member states’ perception of the organization: “People
feel, much more than in other organizations, that they own it, in a positive way—
they’re part and parcel of the organization.” 189
This point raises a question that merits further research and attention: in what
particular ways do international organizations that rely entirely on voluntary
contributions struggle to—and succeed in—retaining their multilateral character? The
next section suggests what part of the answer to the latter question may be,
highlighting ways that member states can engage in collective governance in addition
to—or independently of—directly providing funds.
2. Embedding Unilateral Decisions in Multilateral Frameworks
Even if the final decision to about whether to provide voluntary contributions is
up to individual donors, international institutions have opportunities to collectively
regulate those voluntary contributions, both in terms of substance and process. The
more heavily regulated voluntary contributions are, the more embedded they are in
collective decisions, the less tension there is between multilateralism and the
acceptance of voluntary contributions.
The Paris Agreement on climate change offers an excellent example of
embedding individual, national-level decisions in a multilateral framework. Through
the Paris Agreement, states clearly articulated their shared goals, including “[h]olding
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the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels.” 190 The key issue of how much each party to the Paris
Agreement will contribute to meeting this goal is not determined collectively;
instead, this is a national decision for each individual party to make. 191 Crucially, the
Paris Agreement includes a number of provisions to bridge the gap between these
nationally-determined contributions and the overarching goal. Each nationallydetermined contribution is subject to transparency and reporting requirements. 192
Moreover, the Paris Agreement builds in “global stocktakes”—that is, periodic reviews
of the aggregate effects of these national decisions—and opportunities to revise them
as needed to meet the collectively agreed goals. 193
As described above, WHO’s member states have taken some important steps to
bolster the multilateral character of decisions about WHO’s funding and activities by
incorporating voluntary contributions into the approved budget and by specifically
regulating resource mobilization from non-state actors. Our case study also suggests
some ways that WHO could go even further. One possibility would be to build on the
principles and rules set out in FENSA to further elaborate the terms and conditions
under which WHO will accept voluntary contributions from both state and non-state
actors. For starters, this instrument might codify existing practices within the WHO
secretariat described above in Part 5. Such an instrument might also specify the
procedures for deviating from adopted policies as in the case of program support
costs. When voluntary contributions are negotiated on a purely bilateral basis and
unguided by any rules, the dynamics are too favorable to donors.
Another possibility would be to further enhance transparency with respect to
voluntary contributions. 194 WHO has already taken significant steps to make the
sources and amounts of voluntary contributions publicly available in its biennial
financial reports and on a recently established financing portal in its website. 195 A
further step would be to make the actual funding agreements between WHO and
donors available to member states and to the public. 196 Making available information
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193 Paris Agreement, art. 14.
194 Cf Margaret Lemos and Guy-Uriel Charles, ‘Patriotic Philanthropy: Financing the
State with Gifts to Government’ (2018) 106 California Law Review 1129, 1190-92
(arguing that gifts to government are less troubling when the fact of the gift and
processes of offer and acceptance are transparent to the public).
195 WHO, Programme Budget Web Portal < https://open.who.int>.
196 Gopakumar, above n 78 (noting such agreements are currently not publicly
available).
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about the nature and extent of the strings that are attached to donors’ earmarked
contributions could provoke valuable discussions about these voluntary contributions,
whether WHO ought to accept them, and whether further across-the-board regulation
of voluntary contributions is needed.
These points suggest that a more positive reevaluation of WHO’s special
programs may be in order. 197 Some commentators have been quite critical of these
special programs because they have been largely carved out from WHO’s regular
governance. 198 Again, when it comes to normative evaluations, the baseline matters.
It’s not clear that any of these programs would have survived if they could only be
funded through WHO’s regular budget. Moreover, these special programs have some
real advantages over bilateral earmarked contributions: bilateral earmarked
contributions are “negotiated” totally behind the scenes, just between WHO and the
donor, whereas the special programs are more transparent and institutionalized
through multilateral decision-making involving both donors as well as recipient
countries, thus increasing their perceived legitimacy.
In short, “collective multilateral decisionmaking” is not a binary feature, either
present or absent. Instead, this feature might be stronger or weaker along various
dimensions and at multiple points in the budget decisionmaking process as well as
resource mobilization. 199
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See Beigbeder, above n 47 166-67; Walt, above n 177, 138
199 Cf Lemos and Charles, above n 194, 1190-92 (2018) (identifying a number of factors
that make acceptance by governments of gifts from private actors more or less
troubling).
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